Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 · Applies 14 December 2027
EU Forced Labour Regulation readiness tool
A structured due diligence assessment tool for companies placing products on the EU market. Identify supply chain forced labour risks, close your evidence gaps, and build the documentary record that matters when a complaint is filed — before it arrives.
New here? Run a demo scenario first to see what the tool assesses and how the gap analysis reads. Two scenarios: a prepared company and an unprepared one.
What is this tool, and who is it for?
Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 prohibits the placing, making available, or export of products made with forced labour on the EU market. It applies to every economic operator — from multinationals to SMEs — placing products on the EU market from 14 December 2027. Unlike earlier ESG frameworks, this regulation carries real enforcement consequences: a competent authority can require withdrawal of your products from the market and prohibit their re-import.
This is the EU edition. It assesses readiness under the EU Regulation only. Import enforcement in the United States (UFLPA, CAATSA, Section 307) works on a different logic, with detention at the border and the burden of proof on the importer, and is outside the scope of this edition.
This tool is designed for three distinct users within a single organisation, all of whom need to engage with EUFLR compliance but for different reasons:
Legal & Compliance
Understand your EUFLR obligations precisely. Map evidence gaps to specific regulatory articles. Prepare for the 30-working-day preliminary assessment response window. Build and maintain the evidence log that protects the company if a complaint is filed.
Sustainability & Procurement
Conduct systematic, ILO-indicator-structured supply chain due diligence. Map forced labour risks to your specific commodity-country combinations. Identify where your monitoring and audit processes have gaps. Build the remediation roadmap. Credit existing certifications as evidence.
Board & C-Suite
Understand the regulatory exposure in plain terms. Receive a prioritised gap analysis that distinguishes critical investigation-triggering failures from good-practice aspirations. Export a board-ready report. Know what a complaint scenario looks like for your highest-risk supply chain today.
ℹ
This tool does not certify compliance
It does not tell you your products are free of forced labour. It does not replace legal advice. It assesses your processes for managing forced labour risk — not supplier conduct directly. What it produces is a structured, timestamped record of your due diligence that is the most defensible asset you can have if a competent authority comes knocking.
How the tool is structured
Four sequential stages, plus three standalone tools accessible at any time. You do not need to complete the tool in a single session — your answers are preserved within the browser session. For a first run, allow approximately 4–6 hours distributed across sustainability, legal, and procurement functions.
Stage 1
Company Profiling
Enter your sector, size, sourcing countries, and commodity profile. The tool auto-generates a preliminary risk heat map showing your highest-risk commodity-country combinations against ILO and US DOL data, flags any state-imposed forced labour geographies, and determines which EUFLR provisions apply to your organisation. CSDDD article references throughout the assessment indicate where this due diligence also aligns with the directive; the tool does not assess CSDDD applicability or compliance.
~15
data points
30–45 min
Stage 2
Due Diligence Assessment
Eight structured modules covering the ILO forced labour indicators by supply chain phase. Each question is tagged to the section of the Commission's guidelines it rests on, to its EUFLR article and ILO indicator, and marked as in or beyond the guidelines. Questions include detailed practitioner guidance. Your Stage 1 risk profile determines which module questions are most critical — high-risk commodity-country combinations trigger deeper question sets.
Auto-generated as you complete modules. A ranked gap table distinguishes critical gaps (core elements absent) from high priority (core elements partly in place, or supporting elements absent) and medium priority (supporting elements partly in place). Each gap generates a specific remediation action with minimum adequate response, better practice pathway, effort rating, and indicative timeline.
Auto
generated
0 min extra
Stage 4
Evidence Log
A structured, timestamped record of every due diligence activity — audits, risk assessments, policy reviews, training, corrective actions. Each entry is mapped to the EUFLR article and ILO indicators it evidences. Designed specifically for the preliminary assessment response window. Also generates an investigation scenario simulation showing what a competent authority would find in your highest-risk supply chain today.
Ongoing
maintenance
15 min / entry
Standalone Tool
Complaint Response
Accessible at any time — no need to complete Stages 1–4 first. Enter the date a complaint or preliminary assessment request was received, the implicated product and country, and the alleged ILO indicators. Generates a day-by-day 30-working-day response plan, a live countdown to the submission deadline, and an evidence triage showing what you can currently demonstrate versus where your gaps are.
30
working days
use any time
What does the regulation actually require?
The Core Prohibition
Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 prohibits placing products made with forced labour on the EU market, making them available, or exporting them. The definition of forced labour is adopted from ILO Convention No. 29 (1930): work exacted under menace of penalty from someone who has not offered themselves voluntarily. Both elements must be present simultaneously.
The Due Diligence Standard
The regulation imposes a ban, not a due diligence duty: Article 1(3) says it creates no additional due diligence obligations. Due diligence enters through the investigation. Before opening one, an authority asks the operator what it has done to identify, prevent, mitigate, end or remediate forced labour risks (Article 17(1)), and must not open an investigation where those measures have removed the concern (Article 17(5)). The Commission's guidelines (C/2026/4637, Official Journal 3 September 2026) describe voluntary due diligence on the OECD six-step framework and the ILO indicators — the same structure this tool is built on. They are non-binding, and they say that evidence of due diligence does not guarantee a favourable outcome. Tool questions were verified against the guidelines text in v1.1.
The regulation also covers forced child labour (Article 2(1)) — a narrower category than child labour, and narrower than the worst forms of child labour under ILO C182. The precise legal relationship between child labour and forced labour — and where the ILO draws the line — is explained in full in the Definitions section.
Regulatory Timeline Key Dates
13 December 2024
Regulation Enters Into ForceEU LAW
Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 published and in force. Three-year implementation period begins. Companies should have begun risk profiling and governance work immediately.
14 December 2025
Member State Competent Authorities DesignatedEU LAW
All 27 member states required to designate and notify competent authorities. These differ by member state; the list on the Forced Labour Single Portal is updated as designations are notified. Where the suspected forced labour is outside the EU, the Commission leads the investigation.
30 June 2026
Commission Guidelines Published & Portal LiveEU LAW
The Commission published its implementation guidelines — covering due diligence expectations, the documentation authorities may request, remediation, and penalty methodology — alongside the launch of the Forced Labour Single Portal. Both were legally due 14 June 2026; the guidelines arrived roughly two weeks late, and the risk database is overdue — still in development with no published date. US DOL ILAB and UFLPA Entity List data serve as Stage 1 proxies until it publishes. The guidelines were published unchanged in the Official Journal on 3 September 2026 (C/2026/4637); this tool was verified against that text in v1.1.
Expected 2026
ILAB List of Goods — Next EditionUS DATA
The US DOL ILAB List updates biennially; this tool is built on the 2024 edition, and the next edition was expected around September 2026 (check ilab.dol.gov for the current edition). With the EU risk database overdue, it is this tool's primary Stage 1 risk data layer. The tool's risk mappings will be re-verified on publication — Update 3 in the mandatory schedule.
14 December 2026
Member State Penalty Frameworks EstablishedEU LAW
All member states notify the Commission of national penalty frameworks. Penalties must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. Wide variance expected across jurisdictions — monitor your primary member states.
14 December 2027
Regulation Fully Applicable — Hard DeadlineEU LAW
Prohibition on placing, making available, or exporting products made with forced labour takes full effect. Competent authorities may initiate investigations. Product withdrawal and import ban orders become available. All due diligence must be operational and documented by this date. Do not treat this as a planning horizon — building audit programmes, supply chain mapping, and evidence logs from scratch takes 18–24 months.
A Note on Third-Party Certifications
Certification and audit schemes can contribute evidence of specific due diligence elements, and the Commission's guidelines list participation in them among the documents an authority may request — but no certification is sufficient on its own under the EUFLR, and the company remains responsible for its own due diligence. What gives an audit weight is how it was carried out. The tool takes no position on individual schemes.
Critical limitation: no current scheme provides reliable coverage of state-imposed forced labour contexts (Xinjiang, Turkmenistan), where auditor access is restricted and worker testimony cannot be obtained freely — for those geographies, raw-material traceability and independent verification are required.
The four checks that apply to any scheme are on the Methodology page.
Reference pages available in sidebar:
Demo Mode
Explore with a Sample Company
Select one of two fictional companies below to see how the tool behaves with a realistic pre-populated assessment. All data is illustrative. Demo mode does not overwrite any assessment you have already started — use the Reset button in either scenario to clear it.
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How demo mode works
Clicking "Load Demo" pre-populates Stage 1 and Stage 2 answers with realistic data for the selected company profile, then takes you directly to the Gap Analysis to see the output. The assessment reflects a company that has done some sustainability work but has not yet approached it specifically through the EUFLR lens — which is representative of most companies at this stage of preparation.
Scenario A — Large Enterprise
Meridian Foods Group BV
Fictitious · Food & Beverage · Netherlands
Sector
Food & Beverage processing
Turnover
€2.4 billion
Employees
8,200 (group)
EU Operations
NL, DE, FR, BE
Commodities & Sourcing Origins
Cocoa — Côte d'Ivoire, GhanaHIGH + Child Labour
Coffee — Ethiopia, ColombiaMEDIUM
Seafood — Thailand, IndonesiaHIGH
Pre-Assessment Situation
Has a CSR policy and a supplier code of conduct. Holds a sustainability certification for cocoa. Has conducted social audits at Tier 1. Has never mapped beyond Tier 1. No worker-interview-based audits. No grievance mechanism in supplier worker languages. No investigation readiness plan. CSDDD likely in scope.
5
Critical
7
High
6
Present
Scenario B — SME
Aldgate Apparel Ltd
Fictitious · Fashion Retail · United Kingdom / EU
Sector
Apparel & Footwear
Turnover
€38 million
Employees
145
EU Operations
IE, NL
Commodities & Sourcing Origins
Garments — Bangladesh, IndiaMEDIUM-HIGH
Cotton fibres — India, TurkeyMEDIUM
Pre-Assessment Situation
Small team — one sustainability manager alongside other responsibilities. Has a basic supplier questionnaire. Relies on customer-initiated audits shared by suppliers. No standalone forced labour policy. No supply chain mapping. No grievance mechanism. Has heard of EUFLR but has not yet assessed what it requires. CSDDD not in scope.
7
Critical
8
High
2
Present
Note: These scenarios are deliberately representative rather than worst-case or best-case. Both companies have done some work; neither has approached EUFLR systematically. The gap profiles reflect realistic findings for companies at this stage of preparation — Meridian somewhat further along due to greater resource; Aldgate earlier in the journey but with proportionate expectations under the SME pathway.
Bibliography
Sources, Legal Instruments & Scholarly Literature
Every factual claim, risk rating, legal classification, structural driver description, and remediation recommendation in this tool is traceable to one or more of the following sources. Where the ILO draws distinctions — particularly on child labour versus forced labour — those distinctions are documented here with the specific instruments that establish them.
I. Primary Legal Instruments
The tool is built on these instruments. All assessment questions are tagged to the relevant article or provision.
Foundational Definition
ILO Convention No. 29
Forced Labour Convention, 1930
Provides the definition of forced labour adopted verbatim by Regulation (EU) 2024/3015: work exacted under menace of penalty without voluntary consent. Article 2(1). Both elements — involuntariness and menace of penalty — must be present simultaneously. This instrument is the basis of the C29/C138/C182 distinction explained throughout the child labour sections. The 2014 Protocol to C29 adds obligations on prevention, protection, compensation, and remediation, and has been ratified by all EU member states.
Abolition Standard
ILO Convention No. 105
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
Prohibits forced labour used as political coercion, economic development, labour discipline, punishment for participation in strikes, or racial, social, national, or religious discrimination. Extends the C29 prohibition to state-imposed contexts. Relevant to the Module F state-imposed forced labour questions and the Xinjiang and Turkmenistan risk classifications.
Child Labour — Minimum Age
ILO Convention No. 138
Minimum Age Convention, 1973
This is the instrument that explains why not all child labour is forced labour. C138 prohibits employment below minimum age (15 general; 13 light work; 18 hazardous) on developmental and educational grounds — independently of coercion. A child in light family work with no menace of penalty is in C138 child labour but does not satisfy C29 forced labour. The ILO maintains this distinction deliberately because the required responses differ: C29 requires immediate cessation and prosecution; C138 requires phased elimination with income support and schooling access. Conflating them leads to harmful remediation. C138 is within CSDDD scope but not directly within EUFLR scope.
Child Labour — Worst Forms
ILO Convention No. 182
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999
The link between child labour and forced labour. Article 3(a) defines the worst forms to include all forms of slavery and practices similar to slavery — sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage, serfdom, and forced or compulsory labour. Article 3(b): prostitution and pornography. Article 3(c): use of children in illicit activities. Article 3(d): hazardous work likely to harm health, safety, or morals. The Regulation covers forced child labour (Article 2(1)). The Commission's guidelines (§3.3.3) take from C182 only the Article 3(a) forms, alongside work where the child or the parents are coerced, or where the parents are themselves in forced labour. Hazardous work under Article 3(d) is not by itself within the Regulation's scope. Ratified by 187 ILO member states — the most rapidly ratified ILO convention in history.
The Regulation
Regulation (EU) 2024/3015
EU Forced Labour Regulation, December 2024
The instrument this entire tool is designed around. Key provisions: Article 1(3) (no additional due diligence obligations); Article 2 (definitions, including forced child labour and forced labour imposed by state authorities); Article 3 (prohibition on placing, making available, and exporting products made with forced labour); Article 8 (risk database); Article 14 (risk-based approach to enforcement); Article 15 (the Commission leads where forced labour is outside the EU); Article 17 (preliminary phase: information request on due diligence, 30-working-day response window); Articles 18–22 (investigation, decisions, review); Article 37 (penalties). Recitals 20 (ILO indicators), 32 (SMEs), 36 (remediation), 45 (due diligence) and 48 (changing suppliers) explain the intent. The Commission's guidelines were published in the Official Journal on 3 September 2026 (C/2026/4637); this tool was verified against that text in v1.1. The Portal risk database remains in development.
HRDD Foundation
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
Ruggie, 2011. Endorsed by UN Human Rights Council Resolution 17/4.
The foundational human rights due diligence framework that underlies OECD guidance, CSDDD, and the Shift Project methodology used throughout this tool. The three-pillar structure (Protect, Respect, Remedy) and the "know and show" standard for due diligence inform the evidence log design and the distinction between identifying risks and demonstrating that a company has acted on them. Principle 13 (responsibility to respect) and Principle 17 (HRDD process) are directly relevant to the EUFLR due diligence standard.
II. ILO Operational & Technical Documents
These documents translate the legal instruments into operational practice. They are the primary source for the indicators, the child labour/forced labour distinction, and the quantitative claims throughout the tool.
Indicators — Primary Source
ILO Indicators of Forced Labour
ILO Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour, 2012. Revised November 2025.
The source document for the forced labour indicators that structure Modules B and C of this tool. The Commission's guidelines, citing the 2025 edition, list 14 general indicators and a separate set of 10 structural indicators for state-imposed forced labour (§3.4). Defines each indicator operationally with examples of how it manifests in practice, organised by supply chain phase (recruitment, employment, exit). Also the source for the child labour distinction: the handbook explicitly states that the C29 and C138 frameworks operate separately, and that non-worst-form child labour does not automatically constitute forced labour. Module C questions are tagged to the relevant indicator by name.
Child Labour Methodology
Hard to See, Harder to Count
ILO Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour. Survey guidelines to estimate forced labour of adults and children, 2012. Updated 2024.
The ILO's methodological guidance for surveys measuring forced labour prevalence. Critical to the child labour discussion: this document sets out the ILO position that children in situations meeting C182 worst forms are presumed to satisfy the C29 elements, but that children in other work situations require case-by-case analysis of involuntariness and menace of penalty — meaning non-worst-form child labour is not presumptively forced labour. This is the primary reference for the legal analysis in the child labour section of the Overview page and the Methodology page.
Quantitative Estimates
Global Estimates of Modern Slavery
ILO and Walk Free Foundation, 2022. Updated 2024.
Source for all quantitative claims in this tool relating to global forced labour prevalence: 50 million people in modern slavery (28 million in forced labour); 29 million of those are women or girls; migrants face approximately three times the forced labour risk of non-migrants. These estimates are produced jointly by the ILO and Walk Free Foundation using a methodology combining national household surveys, literature review, and statistical modelling. They are the most methodologically rigorous available and are cited by the EUFLR impact assessment. The figures inform the structural drivers section (gender driver, migration driver) and the sector-level risk discussions.
Business Guidance
Combating Forced Labour: A Handbook for Employers and Business
ILO and IOE. Third (revised) edition, 2025 — the edition the Commission's guidelines cite.
The ILO's practical guidance for businesses on identifying, preventing, and responding to forced labour in operations and supply chains. Bridges the legal framework and operational practice. Source for the supply chain phase structure (recruitment, employment, exit) used throughout Module C, and for the guidance notes explaining what each indicator looks like in practice. The minimum adequate response actions in the Stage 3 remediation roadmap are grounded in this document's recommendations.
Child Labour Remediation
Child Labour Monitoring and Remediation Systems (CLMRS)
ILO IPEC+ and International Cocoa Initiative. Operational guidance, multiple editions.
The primary framework for child labour monitoring and remediation in agricultural supply chains, developed for cocoa but applicable broadly. CLMRS is the source for the C9 question's guidance on structural remediation — the argument that removal of children from work without income replacement is counterproductive, and that remediation must address the structural drivers (poverty, school access, household debt). Also the source for the recommendation to use school enrolment data as a proxy indicator in cocoa supply chain monitoring (C8 guidance).
Cocoa Quantitative Data
Child Labour in the Cocoa Sector
ILO and NORC at the University of Chicago. Survey of child labour in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, multiple editions (2020, 2023).
Source for the quantitative child labour claims in the cocoa risk data: approximately 1.56 million children in child labour in cocoa supply chains in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire combined (2020 estimate; 2023 data showed modest decline). These are the most methodologically robust available estimates, commissioned by the US Department of Labor. They inform the Stage 1 risk heat map flags for cocoa origins and the methodology page commodity tier table.
III. Due Diligence Frameworks
The process architecture of the tool — its eight-module structure, question sequencing, and remediation logic — is grounded in these frameworks.
Process Standard
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct
OECD, 2018.
The six-step due diligence process framework that both EUFLR and CSDDD reference, and which provides the backbone of this tool's module architecture. Step 1 (Embed) = Module A; Step 2 (Identify and Assess) = Modules B and C; Step 3 (Cease, Prevent, Mitigate) = Modules D, E, F; Step 4 (Track) = Module G; Step 5 (Communicate) = Stage 4; Step 6 (Remedy) = Module G. The B5 question draws directly on the Step 2 "likelihood and severity" analysis requirement, which the OECD guidance specifies must engage with operating context and structural factors — not only commodity-country risk lists.
Minerals — Sector Specific
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas
OECD, 4th edition, 2016.
Source for cobalt and electronics risk data methodology, and for the Module F state-imposed forced labour framework in mining contexts. The five-step model in this guidance (establish management systems, identify and assess risk, design and implement response, carry out independent third-party audit, report on DD) maps directly onto Modules D and F for minerals supply chains. The ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism referenced in the cobalt risk data is grounded in this guidance.
HRDD Methodology
UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework
Shift Project and Mazars LLP, 2015.
Provides the operational HRDD methodology that bridges the UNGPs and company reporting practice. Source for the "lean in not walk away" principle referenced in the remediation guidance for high-risk sourcing contexts — the argument that exiting high-risk origins abandons the most vulnerable workers rather than protecting them. Also source for the concept of "severity" (scale, scope, irremediability) used to classify critical versus high versus medium priority gaps in Stage 3.
Living Income & FL Risk
Technical Guidance on Living Income and Forced Labour Risk in Agricultural Supply Chains
LICoP (Living Income Community of Practice) and Shift Project, 2025/2026. Note: consultation draft / not yet formally published as of March 2026. Treat as working document; verify current publication status before citing in a regulatory proceeding.
The document reviewed at the outset of this project. Establishes the link between household income below a living reference price and structural vulnerability to forced labour — specifically exploitation of debt and deceptive recruitment — in agricultural supply chains. Source for the poverty driver in the structural drivers section, and for the C9 question's guidance on income support as essential to child labour remediation. Developed under CSDDD auspices but the income insufficiency framework is directly relevant as a structural risk indicator under EUFLR.
IV. Scholarly Literature
The structural drivers section, in particular, draws on academic literature that goes beyond regulatory frameworks to explain why forced labour occurs where it does.
Structural Model
Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy
Bales, Kevin. University of California Press, 1999. Updated 2012.
Establishes the foundational structural model of modern slavery: high population pressure + low value of individuals + availability of violence = conditions for forced labour. Source for the poverty driver argument — Bales demonstrates that forced labour is not primarily a function of criminal opportunism but of structural economic conditions that make certain populations disposable. The insight that poverty is a structural driver (not merely a correlate) of forced labour informs the B5 question and the structural drivers section of the methodology page.
Debt Bondage Mechanism
Bonded Labor: Tackling the System of Slavery in South Asia
Kara, Siddharth. Columbia University Press, 2012.
The most detailed empirical study of the debt bondage mechanism across South Asia (India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan). Demonstrates that debt bondage consistently originates in a household financial crisis (medical emergency, dowry, crop failure) that cannot be resolved from income alone — meaning income insufficiency below a living threshold is the primary entry point. Source for the "income insufficiency as primary predictor" claim in the poverty driver, and for the argument in C9 guidance that child labour remediation without income support fails. Also source for the operational descriptions of debt bondage in Module C.
Buyer Responsibility
"Modern Slavery as a Management Practice: Exploring the Conditions and Capabilities for Human Exploitation"
Crane, Andrew, LeBaron, Genevieve, Soundararajan, Vivek et al. Academy of Management Review, 2019.
The key academic source for the argument that modern slavery in supply chains is not primarily a governance failure in producing countries but a structural outcome of buyer purchasing practices. The paper identifies specific management practices that transfer cost and risk downstream until workers absorb them through coerced or unpaid labour: below-cost pricing, unrealistic lead times, volume volatility, long payment terms. This argument underpins Driver 6 (Buyer Business Model) in the structural drivers section, and the Module A5 question asking whether due diligence findings are integrated into procurement decisions.
Regulatory Failure Analysis
Combating Modern Slavery: Why Labour Governance is Failing and What We Can Do About It
LeBaron, Genevieve. Polity Press, 2021.
Analyses why existing supply chain governance mechanisms (audit regimes, certification schemes, voluntary codes) consistently fail to eliminate forced labour, and why weak rule of law is a structural enabler. Source for Driver 5 (Weak Rule of Law) arguments, and for the audit checks on the Methodology page — particularly the argument that document-review audit methodologies miss the indicators that require worker interviews to detect.
V. Sector Data Sources & Risk Databases
Stage 1 risk data and commodity-country risk flags draw on these sources. The EUFLR Portal risk database (still in development as of October 2026) will supersede several of these as the authoritative EU reference once published.
Commodity-Country Risk
List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor
US Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). 2024 edition (5 September 2024).
The most comprehensive publicly available commodity-country forced labour risk list: 204 goods from 82 countries in the 2024 edition (September 2024) — the edition this tool is built on. The next biennial edition was expected around September 2026; check ilab.dol.gov for the current edition. Used as Data Layer 2 in the Stage 1 risk heat map. A commodity-country combination appearing on this list triggers elevated risk classification. Note: the 2024 edition added 72 goods (the largest single expansion, mostly downstream goods made with tainted inputs); the tool's embedded risk mappings should be re-verified against the 2024 edition and refreshed on publication of the 2026 edition.
US Department of Labor, ILAB. Launched April 2026.
Three tools launched by ILAB in April 2026. ImportWatch combines ILAB's labour abuse research with US Census import data to produce a red-flag list of high-risk imported goods — a useful companion to the Stage 1 heat map, as it is already crossed with actual trade flows. SourcingStrong supports building labour due diligence systems (relevant to Modules A–D). The Supply Chain Traceability Portal supports visibility beyond Tier 1 (relevant to Module B). All at dol.gov/agencies/ilab.
State-Imposed FL
UFLPA Entity List
US Customs and Border Protection, under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (P.L. 117-78). Maintained continuously.
The US government's list of entities in Xinjiang or working with the Xinjiang government whose products are subject to a rebuttable presumption of forced labour under the UFLPA. Source for the Xinjiang-specific state-imposed forced labour flags in Stage 1 and Module F. Referenced in the Module H5 database monitoring question. While a US instrument, it remains the best available proxy for EUFLR purposes: the Forced Labour Single Portal launched in June 2026, but the EU risk database itself is still in development.
Vulnerability Index
Global Slavery Index
Walk Free Foundation, 2023.
Country-level vulnerability scores across five dimensions: government response, civil and political rights, refugee flows, access to social protection, and conflict/instability. Source for the Walk Free Vulnerability Model reference in Driver 5 (Weak Rule of Law) and in the B5 question guidance. Also contributes to Stage 1 country-level risk scoring for geographies not already flagged by ILO or ILAB data. The quantitative modern slavery estimates in the Index draw on the same ILO/Walk Free methodology as the Global Estimates publication above.
Garments Data
ILO Better Work Programme Country Reports
ILO and International Finance Corporation. Published annually for Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Vietnam.
Factory-level compliance data from the garment sector in programme countries. Source for Bangladesh and Southeast Asian garment sector risk characterisations in the Stage 1 risk data and Methodology page commodity tier table. Better Work reports include indicators directly corresponding to several ILO forced labour indicators — freedom of association, working hours, wages — and are among the few data sources with systematic worker interview methodology at scale.
Tool Version & Update Obligations
The questions in this tool were last substantively updated in October 2026 (v1.1), when every question was verified against the text of the Commission's guidelines as published in the Official Journal (C/2026/4637, 3 September 2026) and against the article numbering of Regulation (EU) 2024/3015. It also incorporates the ILO Forced Labour Indicators as revised in 2025 and the LICoP/Shift Technical Guidance published in early 2026. Two mandatory updates remain scheduled: (1) on publication of the Portal risk database (in development) — Stage 1 risk data will incorporate it, superseding the current ILAB/UFLPA proxies; (2) annually thereafter. Users should not rely on the tool in isolation for legal advice, and should verify that no subsequent updates have been issued before relying on any output for a regulatory proceeding.
A reference glossary for the legal and technical vocabulary used throughout this tool. Organised by framework. Use this during assessment if a term requires clarification, or as a primer before beginning Stage 1.
A. EUFLR Legal Terms Regulation (EU) 2024/3015
These terms carry specific legal meanings under the regulation. Where the regulation's language differs from everyday usage or from the vocabulary of related frameworks (CSDDD, UK MSA), the distinction is noted.
Forced Labour
Art. 2 EUFLR · ILO C29 Art. 2(1)
"All work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily."
Two elements must both be present simultaneously. Involuntariness: the worker did not freely consent, or consent was obtained through deception or coercion. Menace of penalty: any threatened consequence of sufficient gravity — this does not require physical violence; it includes threatened job loss, debt enforcement, document retention, confinement, or denunciation to authorities. Neither element alone is sufficient. A worker who freely chose difficult or poorly-paid work is not in forced labour. A worker threatened with violence but who genuinely volunteered is an edge case the ILO treats contextually. The 2014 Protocol to C29 adds obligations on prevention, protection, compensation, and access to remedies.
Excluded from the Definition
ILO C29 Art. 2(2) · EC Guidelines §3.2.1
Five kinds of compulsory work fall outside the forced labour definition under ILO C29 Art. 2(2), and so outside EUFLR scope (guidelines §3.2.1): (1) compulsory military service of a purely military character; (2) normal civic obligations; (3) work exacted as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided it is carried out under public supervision and the person is not hired to or placed at the disposal of private parties; (4) work in emergencies such as war or natural disaster; and (5) minor communal services. The third exclusion is the one that matters commercially — and it is narrow. Prison labour supplied to private companies, or performed without judicial conviction (administrative detention, "re-education" facilities), does not qualify for the exclusion. This is precisely why Xinjiang detention-facility labour is squarely within scope: it lacks judicial conviction and serves private production. The guidelines add that any of these kinds of work can fall back within the definition in the circumstances ILO C105 describes. Separately, services and domestic work are outside the Regulation because it covers products only.
Forced labour imposed by state authorities — a distinct subcategory under EUFLR carrying heightened enforcement consequences. Distinguished from ordinary forced labour in two respects: (1) the coercing party is the state rather than a private employer, making individual worker agency and employer compliance measures largely irrelevant; (2) standard audit mechanisms are insufficient because auditor access is restricted and worker testimony cannot be obtained freely. The Regulation makes it a criterion for prioritising cases (Art. 14(2)(a)); the guidelines treat on-site audits as compromised in these settings (§6.4.2.2) and disengagement as possibly the only viable response (§6.4.3.1). Currently documented at industrial scale in: Xinjiang (cotton, polysilicon — state mobilisation of Uyghur labour); Turkmenistan (cotton harvest — state mobilisation of civil servants and students); North Korean labour exported to third countries. ILO Convention No. 105 (1957) prohibits use of forced labour as a political, economic, or social control instrument by states.
Economic Operator
Art. 2 EUFLR
Any natural or legal person who places or makes products available on the EU market or exports them — regardless of where in the supply chain they sit. This is a deliberately broad definition: it includes manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and online platform operators. It does not mean only large companies. An SME importing finished goods from a third country is an economic operator under EUFLR. The regulation applies to the entity that makes the product available — not (only) to the entity that made it. This is distinct from CSDDD, which applies to the company's own operations and its direct and indirect business relationships, and which has explicit size thresholds. EUFLR has no size threshold in its base application, though authorities must take an operator's size and resources into account (Art. 14(4), Art. 22(1)(b); Recital 32), and member states provide contact points for SMEs (Art. 10).
Placing on the Market
Art. 2 EUFLR
Making a product available for the first time on the EU market — specifically, the act of a manufacturer or importer who introduces a product into the EU distribution chain. Distinguished from "making available on the market" (any subsequent supply in the distribution chain, including retail). Both are covered by the prohibition in Article 3. The distinction matters for determining which economic operator bears primary regulatory responsibility — the first placer in the EU chain — though all subsequent distributors who "make available" are also in scope. Export is also covered: Article 3 prohibits export of products made with forced labour from the EU market as well as import.
Temporal Scope
Art. 3, 39 EUFLR · EC Guidelines §3.1
The prohibition applies to products placed, made available, or exported on or after 14 December 2027 — including where the products or their components were produced, or imported into the EU, before that date. The Commission's implementation guidelines confirm this reading. The practical consequence is easy to miss: inventory manufactured in 2026 and sitting in an EU warehouse is caught the moment it is sold after the application date. There is no grandfathering of pre-2027 production, and "we bought it before the regulation applied" is not a defence — the regulated act is the placing or making available, not the manufacture. Companies holding long-cycle inventory (apparel seasons, electronics, automotive parts) should treat their existing stock as in-scope now.
Preliminary Assessment
Art. 17 EUFLR
The first formal stage of a competent authority investigation. The authority issues a request to the economic operator for information and documentation relevant to the alleged forced labour. The economic operator has 30 working days (approximately six calendar weeks) to respond. The authority then decides whether to open a full investigation. The due diligence carried out by the economic operator is the subject of the request (Article 17(1)), and the authority must not open an investigation where it finds no substantiated concern, or where due diligence measures have removed the concern (Article 17(5)). The Complaint Response tool (accessible from the sidebar at any time) is designed specifically for this 30-working-day window. Evidence dated before a request shows a system that was already working; the guidelines also let operators report more recent action and allow authorities to give time for steps already under way (§4.5.3.2, §4.6.1).
Competent Authority
Art. 5, 15 EUFLR · EC Guidelines §4.1
The authority that investigates and enforces the EUFLR prohibition. Each member state designates one or more national competent authorities (Art. 5). Which authority leads depends on where the forced labour is suspected (Art. 15): outside the EU, the Commission acts as lead competent authority; inside a member state, that state's authority leads. Decisions are enforced by the competent authority of each member state, which contacts the operators established on its territory (guidelines §5.1.1). Member state authorities were to be designated by 14 December 2025; the list on the Forced Labour Single Portal is updated as designations are notified. A company importing from outside the EU should therefore expect to deal with the Commission in an investigation and with its national authority on enforcement.
Due Diligence (EUFLR)
Art. 1(3), 2(3), 17 EUFLR · Recital 45
The EUFLR does not prescribe a due diligence standard and creates no additional due diligence obligations (Article 1(3)). It defines due diligence in relation to forced labour as an operator's efforts to implement mandatory requirements or voluntary guidelines to identify, prevent, mitigate or end forced labour (Article 2(3)). In the preliminary phase the authority asks what the operator has done, on the basis of Union or national law, the Commission's guidelines, or UN, ILO and OECD guidance (Article 17(1)), and must not open an investigation where those measures have removed the concern (Article 17(5)). The Commission's guidelines (C/2026/4637, Official Journal 3 September 2026) set out voluntary due diligence on the OECD six-step framework, name alternatives such as traceability, responsible purchasing, certification schemes and worker-driven monitoring (§4.5.1.1), and list the documentation authorities may request (§4.7). They state that providing it does not guarantee exculpation. Almost every step carries a lighter alternative for SMEs — a principle this tool reflects in its SME answer standards and in how it distinguishes minimum adequate response from better practice in Stage 3.
Penalties
Art. 37 EUFLR · EC Guidelines §5.2
A point widely misunderstood: penalties are not imposed for violating the forced labour ban itself. They are imposed for failing to comply with a competent authority's ban-violation decision — continuing to sell banned products, failing to withdraw them, or failing to replace affected components. The consequence of the ban itself is the decision: prohibition, withdrawal, and disposal of the goods (recycling or, where that is not possible, rendering the goods inoperable; perishable goods are donated). The Commission's guidelines set out a five-step penalty calculation methodology — gravity, duration, mitigating and aggravating circumstances, applicable thresholds, and the overarching principles of effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness — with two illustrative approaches: one based on the value of the products (for example 0–10%, 10–30% or 30–60% by gravity, multiplied by a duration coefficient) and one based on annual global turnover (for example 0–1%, 1–2% or 1–4%). Member states must notify their national penalty rules to the Commission by 14 December 2026. One nuance from the guidelines: for strategically or critically important products, authorities may order goods withheld for a period, rather than disposed of, while the forced labour is addressed.
The ILO operates a framework of four conventions relevant to forced and child labour. Understanding how they relate to each other — and where their scope diverges — is essential for accurate risk assessment and the child labour analysis below.
C29 1930
Forced Labour Convention
Provides the foundational two-element definition (involuntariness + menace of penalty) adopted by EUFLR. Requires member states to suppress all forms of forced labour. Does not distinguish child from adult workers — applies to any person. The 2014 Protocol adds modern slavery, trafficking, and debt bondage obligations. EUFLR scope: primary instrument.
C105 1957
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention
Prohibits forced labour as a tool of political coercion, economic development, labour discipline, strike punishment, or discrimination. Adds state-as-coercer dimension absent from C29. Relevant to the Xinjiang and Turkmenistan state-imposed forced labour classifications in Module F. EUFLR scope: Art. 2(2) defines state-imposed forced labour by reference to C105.
C138 1973
Minimum Age Convention
Prohibits employment below minimum age on developmental and educational grounds — independently of coercion. Minimum age: 15 generally; 13 for light work; 18 for hazardous work; developing country flexibility provisions exist. This is the instrument that explains why not all child labour is forced labour. A child doing light work on a family farm below minimum age, with no menace of penalty, is in C138 child labour but does not satisfy C29. The required response differs accordingly (see child labour section below). CSDDD scope; not directly EUFLR scope.
C182 1999
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention
Defines worst forms to include (Art. 3): (a) all forms of slavery and practices similar to slavery, including trafficking, debt bondage and forced or compulsory labour; (b) prostitution and pornography; (c) use in illicit activities; (d) hazardous work likely to harm health, safety, or morals. Only the first category links directly to the EUFLR. The Regulation covers forced child labour (Art. 2(1)); the Commission's guidelines (§3.3.3) count the Article 3(a) forms, together with work where the child or the parents are coerced or the parents are themselves in forced labour. Hazardous work under Article 3(d) is not within scope unless one of those conditions is present. Ratified by 187 ILO member states — the fastest ratification of any ILO convention. EUFLR scope: Art. 2(1), for the Art. 3(a) forms.
The ILO Forced Labour Indicators — Reference Definitions
The Commission's guidelines list 14 common indicators of forced labour (§3.4), following the ILO's 2025 revision, and refer to the ILO's own guidance for their definitions. The short descriptions below are this tool's summaries. Indicators are signals that forced labour may be present — not legal elements of the definition. One strong indicator, or several weaker indicators together, may be sufficient to conclude forced labour is occurring; the guidelines treat the number of indicators present as one measure of severity (§4.3.1).
aForced recruitmentRecruitment
The worker is recruited without a free choice — for example through abduction, sale, confinement during recruitment, or recruitment tied to a debt or an obligation imposed by others.
bDeceptionRecruitment
False promises about the nature, location, conditions, or pay of work used to recruit. Contract substitution on arrival. Falsification of documents. Particularly prevalent in cross-border migrant worker recruitment.
cExploitation of debtRecruitment · Employment
Workers trapped by debts they are unable to repay from wages — typically originating in recruitment fees, transportation costs, housing, food, or equipment charges. The debt is often manipulated to be unpayable. Primary mechanism linking poverty to forced labour in agricultural supply chains.
dHazardous or degrading working conditionsEmployment
Work in hazardous or degrading conditions, without adequate protective equipment or compensation, that the worker would not freely accept and cannot refuse.
eOnerous working hours or work scheduleEmployment
Abusive requirements for overtime or on-call work, beyond legal limits and without consent, under threat of penalty for refusal. Persistent in export-oriented manufacturing under buyer price and lead time pressure.
fDegrading work-related living conditionsEmployment
Employer-controlled accommodation or living arrangements that are overcrowded, unsafe or insanitary, and that the worker cannot leave or change.
gAbusive additional obligationsEmployment
Work or tasks imposed beyond what was agreed: work of a different nature from that specified at recruitment, work for the employer's private household, or obligations placed on family members.
hPhysical or sexual violenceEmployment
Actual or threatened physical violence, sexual violence, or psychological abuse as a means of controlling labour. Includes violence by employer, supervisor, security personnel, or other workers on behalf of management.
iAbuse of isolationEmployment
Workers cut off from family, community, or legal support networks. Compound or plantation housing designed to prevent external contact. Communication monitoring or restriction. Heightens all other indicators by reducing the possibility of external intervention.
jRestrictions on workers' movementsEmployment
Workers prevented from leaving the workplace, dormitory, or geographic area. Includes physical confinement, confiscation of transport, curfews and timed absences, and digital surveillance of movement.
kRetention of cash, assets or identity documentsEmployment · Exit
Passports, identity cards, work permits, cash or other assets held by the employer or a labour broker without the worker's free and informed consent. Effective restriction of movement even without physical confinement. Common in migrant worker contexts.
lWithholding of wagesEmployment · Exit
Non-payment, underpayment, irregular payment, or unlawful deductions from wages used as a means of retaining workers or creating debt. Includes wage theft, kickbacks to supervisors, and manipulated piece-rate calculations.
mThreats or intimidationEmployment
Threats of dismissal, deportation, denunciation to authorities, or harm to the worker's family as a means of preventing them from leaving or complaining. Threats do not need to be carried out to constitute menace of penalty under C29.
nAbuse of vulnerabilityAll phases
The worker is in a position of vulnerability that is exploited to obtain work they would not freely accept. Relevant factors: undocumented migration status, poverty, disability, displacement, discrimination, remote location, or status as a third-country national.
Ten structural indicators for state-imposed forced labour (§3.4): imprisonment and detention; manipulation of custodial conditions; financial penalty imposed by the state; withdrawal or denial of state services, legal status and social entitlements; expropriation or confiscation of property, land, housing or means of production; employment sanctions imposed by the state or state enterprises; legal prohibition on employment termination; surveillance and social monitoring; state-induced psychological coercion and ideological pressure; and collective and third-party penalties. These are assessed from the legal, institutional and political context rather than at a single workplace — see Module F.
C. Child Labour — The Precise Legal Position The ILO Line Explained
The question "is all child labour forced labour?" has an answer that is precise, important, and frequently misunderstood — including in some regulatory compliance literature. The ILO's answer is no. And under the EUFLR, not even every worst form of child labour counts as forced child labour: the Commission's guidelines name four situations (§3.3.3). The distinction is not semantic: it determines which legal instrument applies, what the required response is, and whether immediate enforcement or structural remediation is the appropriate course of action.
The Two-Element Test Applied to Children
Element 1 — Involuntariness
ILO doctrine does not hold that children are categorically incapable of any consent for all purposes. What it holds is more specific: that in situations involving worst-form child labour — trafficking, debt bondage, coercion — the circumstances themselves negate any meaningful consent. For non-worst-form situations, the ILO applies a contextual analysis: a child working on a family farm, for example, is not presumed to have been coerced into it in the same way a trafficked child is. The presence of parental authority is not automatically equivalent to an employer's coercive power.
Element 2 — Menace of Penalty
This element must be assessed in each situation. A child doing light domestic work at home, or helping with a harvest without any threatened consequence for stopping, does not satisfy this element regardless of age. A child in debt bondage, or facing violence or deprivation if they refuse to work, clearly does. The ILO's Indicators of Forced Labour handbook (2012, revised 2025) explicitly states that non-worst-form child labour does not automatically constitute forced labour under C29, and must be assessed against both elements in context.
The Four Categories — Where the ILO Draws the Line
C182 Art. 3(a). Both C29 elements structurally satisfied — coercion and involuntariness are inherent to the situation, not incidental. Immediate cessation, law enforcement referral, and access to remedies required. Within EUFLR scope as forced child labour (Art. 2(1); guidelines §3.3.3).
C29 ✓ Forced Labour
C182 ✓ Worst Forms
EUFLR ✓ In Scope
Worst
Hazardous child labour under coercive conditions
C182 Art. 3(d). Children in hazardous work (mining, deep-sea fishing, toxic chemical exposure, heavy machinery) where they cannot freely leave. Satisfies C29 where the child or the parents are coerced and refusal is practically impossible. It is the coercion, not the hazard, that brings the case within the EUFLR (guidelines §3.3.3). Examples: DRC cobalt artisanal mining, certain West African cocoa operations.
C29 ✓ Forced Labour
C182 ✓ Worst Forms
EUFLR ✓ In Scope
Standard
Hazardous child labour without coercive conditions
C182 Art. 3(d) applies. Hazardous work regardless of coercion. C29 assessment is contextual — if the child can freely leave but chooses not to due to poverty, the menace of penalty element requires analysis. Often a borderline case. In practice, hazardous conditions and coercive conditions co-occur frequently. Requires immediate withdrawal from the hazard. Outside EUFLR scope unless coercion of the child or the parents is present (guidelines §3.3.3).
C29 — Contextual
C182 ✓ Worst Forms
EUFLR ✗ Not by itself
C138
Non-hazardous work below minimum age, without coercion
C138 only. Light farm work, household tasks, family business assistance. Prohibited on developmental grounds regardless of conditions — but the menace of penalty element of C29 is absent, so this is not forced labour. The ILO explicitly preserves this distinction. Requires phased elimination with income support, school access, and household debt resolution — not immediate enforcement action. Abrupt withdrawal without addressing the income gap that drove the child's presence typically worsens outcomes.
C29 ✗ Not FL
C138 ✓ Child Labour
EUFLR ✗ Not Direct
Why the ILO Preserves This Distinction — The Policy Reason
The ILO maintains the C138/C29 distinction deliberately and documents it in its operational guidance (Indicators of Forced Labour, 2012; Hard to See, Harder to Count, 2012/2024). The policy reason: non-worst-form child labour in agricultural supply chains is overwhelmingly a symptom of household poverty below a living income threshold, not of employer criminality. The household cannot meet basic needs from adult income alone; the child's labour contribution is a coping mechanism. If a company responds to finding C138 child labour by immediately terminating the supplier — or a competent authority responds by ordering product withdrawal — the household loses income without the underlying poverty being addressed. Research across cocoa supply chains (ILO/NORC surveys, Chocolate Score Card data) consistently shows that abrupt supplier termination increases child labour in the same region as households find less visible alternatives. The CLMRS (Child Labour Monitoring and Remediation Systems) framework — developed by ILO IPEC+ and the International Cocoa Initiative — is built on this insight: effective remediation requires ongoing community monitoring, income support, school fee coverage, and farmer price improvement, coordinated over time. This is why the tool's C9 question asks whether the organisation has assessed the structural causes of child labour, and whether remediation goes beyond removal.
D. Supply Chain Terminology Industry Convention · Not EUFLR Terminology
Several terms used throughout this tool are industry convention rather than regulatory definitions. This matters because a legal argument framed in industry terms may not map cleanly onto what the regulation actually requires.
Due Diligence vs. Compliance
Conceptual distinction
Compliance asks: does the supplier meet a defined standard? It is binary, point-in-time, and produces a pass/fail result. Due diligence asks: what did the company do to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for its impacts on human rights? It is process-oriented, continuous, and produces a documentary record rather than a certification. The EUFLR is a product ban, and due diligence is how a company shows what it did about the risk: under Article 17 the authority asks about it before opening an investigation. It is not a defence — the guidelines say evidence does not guarantee exculpation (§4.7) — and it is not a certification. A company that has done extensive, documented due diligence but whose supply chain still contains forced labour is in a very different regulatory position from one that has done none. This distinction is why the Evidence Log (Stage 4) is as important as the gap assessment (Stage 3).
Traceability
Conceptual distinction
The ability to identify and follow the pathway of a product, ingredient, or material through the supply chain from origin to final product. Distinguished from supply chain mapping (knowing who your suppliers and sub-suppliers are) — traceability adds origin-specificity: not just "we source cotton from India" but "this fabric contains cotton from these specific farms in Gujarat." For forced labour purposes, traceability to raw material origin is the evidentiary standard required for state-imposed forced labour contexts (Xinjiang, Turkmenistan) because standard audit evidence is insufficient there. Mass-balance certification provides blended origin claims that serve sustainability reporting but do not establish physical traceability to origin.
Leverage
OECD · Shift · UNGPs
The ability of a company to effect change in the practices of a supplier. Leverage is a function of purchasing volume, strategic importance of the relationship to the supplier, and the buyer's willingness to use commercial relationships to drive change. The OECD and Shift frameworks both identify leverage as a key determinant of what due diligence response is appropriate — a company with high leverage over a supplier has different obligations than one with negligible leverage (e.g. one of thousands of customers buying an undifferentiated commodity). Increasing leverage — through long-term purchase commitments, supplier development investment, collective action with other buyers — is itself a valid due diligence strategy rather than a precondition for it.
Specifications
Tool Specification Sheet
A structured technical reference for governance sign-off, procurement evaluation, or regulatory disclosure. States precisely what this tool covers, what it does not cover, how its data is sourced and maintained, and what update obligations apply. Where relevant, a competent authority reviewing your due diligence process may ask what tool or methodology underpinned your assessment — this page provides the answer.
Identity & Version
Tool Name
EU Forced Labour Regulation readiness tool (EUFLR Readiness Tool)
Current Version
v1.2 — Full US DOL List of Goods embedded; questions as verified in v1.1 against the Commission guidelines text (C/2026/4637)
November 2026. v1.2 embeds the full US DOL List of Goods in the Stage 1 risk map and bundles the fonts so the tool contacts no outside server; the questions and scoring are unchanged from v1.1 (October 2026), which advanced from v1.0 (July 2026, aligned on secondary analysis) after a line-by-line review against the Official Journal text. Next version advance: on publication of the Portal risk database.
Last Substantive Update
October 2026
All questions verified against the guidelines text: 18 reworded, the forced child labour scope narrowed (C.8), nine added (A.8, A.9, C.10, D.6, D.7, G.5, G.6, H.6, H.7). The US regime layer (three questions, the border stress-test and the detention planner) was removed from this EU edition. Article references corrected to the Regulation as adopted. Indicator list updated to the 14 general and 10 state-imposed indicators in the guidelines. SME answer standards added; named-scheme assessments removed. Earlier: guidelines first incorporated July 2026 (v1.0); ILO indicators and LICoP/Shift guidance March 2026.
Primary Regulatory Instrument
Regulation (EU) 2024/3015
Entered into force 13 December 2024. Full application from 14 December 2027.
Format
Single-file HTML application
Runs entirely in-browser. No server-side processing. No data transmitted. Session state only — not persisted between sessions.
Intended Users
Legal, sustainability, procurement, board
Designed for cross-functional use. Distinct utility for each function — see user persona descriptions on Overview page.
Regulatory Coverage
This table states precisely which provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 are addressed by the tool, which adjacent instruments are covered, and which are out of scope.
Provision / Instrument
Status
Coverage Note
EUFLR Art. 3 — Prohibition
✓ Full
Core prohibition addressed throughout. All assessment modules structured around demonstrating what actions have been taken to prevent placing products made with forced labour on the market.
EUFLR Art. 17 — Due Diligence in the Preliminary Phase
✓ Full
The tool is designed to generate the information an authority requests under Art. 17(1): what the operator did to identify, prevent, mitigate, end or remediate forced labour risks. The Module A–H structure follows the six steps in the Commission's guidelines (§6.4).
Addressed by the Complaint Response standalone tool, which generates a day-by-day response plan and live countdown from the date of complaint receipt.
EUFLR Art. 5, 15 — Competent Authorities
~ Partial
Tool explains the designation framework and the Commission's lead role where forced labour is outside the EU. Does not maintain a live directory of member state authority designations — users should verify on the Forced Labour Single Portal (live since June 2026).
EUFLR Commission Implementation Guidelines
✓ Aligned
Published 30 June 2026 and in the Official Journal on 3 September 2026 (C/2026/4637). All eight modules were verified line by line against that text in v1.1. Each question shows the guideline section it rests on, or is marked as going beyond the guidelines. The guidelines are non-binding and may be updated; customs guidance under Art. 27 is still to come.
EUFLR Forced Labour Single Portal
~ Partial
Portal launched June 2026 (guidelines, competent authority list, and — from application — published ban decisions). The EU forced labour risk database remains in development: until it is published, the US DOL ILAB List of Goods and UFLPA Entity List continue to serve as Stage 1 risk-screening proxies. Stage 1 heat map will be updated on database publication.
ILO C29 — Forced Labour Definition
✓ Full
The two-element definition (involuntariness + menace of penalty) is the basis of all 52 core assessment questions and all risk classifications.
ILO C138 — Minimum Age (Child Labour)
~ Partial
Addressed in Module C (C8, C9) and in the Definitions page. Not directly within EUFLR scope, but within CSDDD scope and a structural risk indicator. Tool notes the C138/EUFLR distinction explicitly throughout.
ILO C182 — Worst Forms of Child Labour
✓ Full
Forced child labour is within EUFLR scope (Art. 2(1)); of the C182 worst forms, the guidelines count the slavery-like forms only (§3.3.3). Addressed in Module C and throughout child labour sections of Overview, Methodology, and Definitions pages.
ILO C105 — Abolition of Forced Labour
✓ Full
State-imposed forced labour context addressed in Module F. Xinjiang, Turkmenistan, North Korean export labour flagged throughout Stage 1 risk data.
CSDDD — Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence
~ Partial
Where CSDDD obligations overlap with EUFLR (governance structure, supply chain mapping, grievance mechanisms), the tool notes the dual relevance. CSDDD-specific obligations (value chain partners, direct business relationships threshold, transition plans) not addressed. Separate CSDDD readiness assessment required for companies in scope.
UK Modern Slavery Act
↗ Ref
Referenced in Stage 1 company profile. Tool notes that MSA transparency statement obligations do not satisfy EUFLR due diligence standard — different purpose, different evidence threshold.
UFLPA — Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (US)
↗ Ref
UFLPA Entity List used as a proxy data source for Xinjiang SIFL risk pending EUFLR Portal. Rebuttable presumption standard under UFLPA differs from EUFLR — compliance with one does not imply compliance with the other.
Assessment Structure & Question Inventory
52 assessment questions across 8 modules in Stage 2. Each question is tagged by its basis (in or beyond the Commission's guidelines) and its priority, and mapped to one or more ILO forced labour indicators and the relevant EUFLR articles. CSDDD article references (Directive 2024/1760 as amended by Directive (EU) 2026/470) are alignment annotations only — they indicate where the forced labour due diligence assessed here also follows the directive's provisions; the tool does not assess CSDDD applicability or compliance.
AGovernance & Policy
9
questions
EC Guidelines §6.4.1; OECD Step 1
Policy, board accountability, supplier code, training, procurement integration, publication, public communication, purchasing practices, supplier support
Rest on a section of C/2026/4637 — voluntary recommendations, not legal requirements
5
Beyond the Guidelines
Rest on ILO, OECD or UNGP practice (B.5, C.9, D.2, E.5, H.4)
23
Country Risk Entries in Stage 1
Across 8 commodity categories
Data Sources & Version Dates
The Stage 1 risk heat map and all commodity-country risk flags draw on the following data sources. Version dates are stated so a user can identify when the underlying data was last refreshed.
ILO Forced Labour Indicators
November 2025
✓ Full
Module C is structured around the indicators as listed in the Commission's guidelines (§3.4): 14 general indicators and 10 structural indicators for state-imposed forced labour.
ILO Global Estimates of Modern Slavery
2022 (updated 2024)
✓ Full
Source for all quantitative prevalence claims: 50m people in modern slavery, 28m in forced labour, 29m women/girls, 3× migrant risk. Next update expected 2026.
ILO / NORC Cocoa Child Labour Survey
2023
✓ Full
Source for ~1.56m children in child labour in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire cocoa supply chains. 2023 data shows modest decline from 2020 peak.
US DOL ILAB List of Goods
Current edition (2024)
✓ Full
Stage 1 risk heat map Data Layer 2. 204 goods from 82 countries (2024 edition). Updated periodically — check ilab.dol.gov for currency.
UFLPA Entity List
Maintained continuously
✓ Full
State-imposed forced labour proxy for Xinjiang pending EUFLR Portal. Updated by US CBP on rolling basis. Check cbp.gov/uflpa for current list.
Walk Free Global Slavery Index
2023
✓ Full
Country vulnerability scoring used for rule-of-law risk driver in structural drivers section. Next edition expected 2025/2026.
ILO Better Work Country Reports
Various (2023–2024)
~ Partial
Garments sector data for Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Jordan. Coverage limited to programme countries.
EUFLR Portal Risk Database
Not yet operational
⟳ Pending
Was due 14 June 2026; still in development in October 2026. Will supersede ILAB list and UFLPA proxy as authoritative EU source. Stage 1 risk data will be updated on Portal launch.
Commission Implementation Guidelines
OJ 3 September 2026
✓ Full
Commission Notice C/2026/4637. Non-binding guidance on scope, the investigative process, enforcement and penalties, and voluntary forced labour due diligence. All questions were verified against the text in v1.1.
US State Dept. TIP Report
Annual (June)
✓ In Use
Trafficking in Persons Report — annual country-level tier ratings (Tier 1 / 2 / 2WL / 3) for trafficking and forced labour government response. Authoritative cross-country governance benchmark. Informs country-level risk scoring in Stage 1 alongside ILAB and Walk Free.
ASPI Xinjiang Data Project
Ongoing
✓ In Use
Australian Strategic Policy Institute — facility and company mapping of Xinjiang forced labour in cotton and polysilicon supply chains. Referenced by US CBP and European Commission. Most rigorous independent evidence base for SIFL risk in these commodities. Used to inform Module F SIFL risk classifications.
Sheffield Hallam University — Supply Chain Research
2020–2023
✓ In Use
Sector-specific supply chain tracing reports on Xinjiang cotton (2020) and polysilicon (2021, 2023). Commissioned basis evidence used by multiple governments and the EU in their SIFL risk assessments. Most detailed available traceability analysis for these specific commodity-origin combinations.
Seafood Task Force / NOAA Fisheries
Annual
~ Partial
Seafood sector labour risk data, including vessel-level IUU fishing and forced labour overlap. Source for Thai and Indonesian fishing fleet risk characterisations in Stage 1. Coverage limited to Seafood Task Force programme countries.
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre
Ongoing
~ Reference
Company and sector tracking of human rights allegations including forced labour. Not a primary evidence source but useful for identifying emerging sector risks and company-specific allegations that may trigger investigation risk. Referenced in Module H5 monitoring guidance.
Explicit Scope Limitations
Stated clearly so there is no ambiguity about what the tool does and does not do. A user relying on this tool for a regulatory proceeding should read this section.
✗
Does not certify compliance
The tool assesses the existence and quality of processes — not whether your supply chain is free of forced labour. No tool, audit, or certification can make that claim. Forced labour is by definition hidden. What the tool evidences is that the required steps to identify and prevent it were taken.
✗
Does not assess specific suppliers
The tool assesses your organisation's processes for managing suppliers — not the conduct of any specific supplier. Findings are about your due diligence system, not about whether Supplier X is compliant.
✗
Does not constitute legal advice
The tool is an operational assessment aid. It is not a legal opinion on your EUFLR compliance position. Legal counsel should review any output used in a regulatory proceeding.
✗
Does not predict competent authority outcomes
The gap analysis and priority ratings reflect the tool's own weighting of what the Commission's guidelines and the OECD framework recommend. They do not predict how a specific competent authority in a specific member state will assess a specific set of facts.
✗
Does not cover all CSDDD obligations
Where EUFLR and CSDDD overlap, the tool notes dual relevance. CSDDD-specific obligations — including value chain partner engagement obligations, transition plans, and the direct/indirect business relationship threshold — require separate assessment.
✗
The guidelines are guidance, not law
Version 1.1 was verified line by line against the Commission's guidelines as published in the Official Journal (C/2026/4637). The guidelines are non-binding and may be updated; they say themselves that only the Regulation has legal force and that its binding interpretation belongs to the Court of Justice. The EU forced labour risk database remains in development; Stage 1 continues to use US DOL ILAB and UFLPA data as proxies until it is published.
✗
Session-only data persistence
Assessment responses are held in browser session memory only and are not saved between sessions. Use the Export Report function (Stage 4) to preserve your assessment output before closing the browser.
Mandatory Update Schedule
Four scheduled updates are committed to. Users should verify the version date before relying on tool output for a compliance decision or regulatory proceeding.
Update 1 · Done
30 June 2026
Commission Guidelines
Completed July 2026. Guidelines published 30 June 2026. Assessment questions reviewed against the published guidelines; Modules A, G, and H updated (two questions added — A.6, A.7 — bringing the core total to 43; a question-count discrepancy in earlier prose, which stated 38 against an actual 41, was corrected in the same release). Tool advanced from v0.9 to v1.0. The verbatim review followed in October 2026 (v1.1): all modules checked against the Official Journal text, 18 questions reworded and nine added (core total 52), article references corrected. v1.2 (November 2026) embedded the full US DOL List of Goods (2024 edition: 204 goods, 82 countries) in the Stage 1 risk map, without changing the questions.
Mandatory
Update 2
On database publication
Portal Risk Database (in development)
Stage 1 risk heat map updated to incorporate the Forced Labour Single Portal risk database as Data Layer 1 (superseding current ILAB proxy). Country and commodity risk entries reviewed and recategorised where Portal data differs from current classifications. Module H5 database monitoring question updated to include Portal monitoring workflow.
Mandatory
Update 3
Expected 2026
ILAB List — Next Edition
The ILAB List of Goods updates on a biennial cadence; the next edition was expected around September 2026. The Stage 1 commodity-country risk mappings will be re-verified against it on publication (the 2024 edition added 72 goods, so material additions are likely). If the EU Portal risk database publishes first, that update takes precedence and this one folds into it.
Mandatory
Update 4
Annual
From December 2026
Full annual review: ILAB list currency check; ILO Global Estimates update (expected 2026); Walk Free Index update; Better Work country report refresh; UFLPA Entity List material changes; any new Commission guidance, enforcement decisions, or member state authority guidance that affects question content or priority weightings.
Scheduled
Methodology & Data Sources
How the Assessment Works
The technical and regulatory foundations of this tool — what data it uses, what the assessment questions are based on, how the geographic and tier dimensions are captured, and how third-party certifications are integrated as evidence.
Regulatory & Framework Foundations
Primary Law
Regulation (EU) 2024/3015
The EUFLR itself. It imposes a ban on products, not a due diligence duty (Art. 1(3)). Questions are tagged to the articles that govern investigations, decisions and enforcement, and to the section of the Commission's guidelines (C/2026/4637) they rest on. Questions marked "beyond the guidelines" rest on ILO, OECD or UNGP practice. The tool was verified against the guidelines text in v1.1.
Indicator Framework
ILO Forced Labour Indicators
The forced labour indicators published by the International Labour Organisation, revised in 2025. The Commission's guidelines list 14 general indicators and 10 structural indicators for state-imposed forced labour (§3.4). They describe what forced labour looks like operationally, phase by phase (recruitment, employment, exit). Every Module C question maps to one or more indicators.
Due Diligence Process
OECD DD Guidance (2018)
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct provides the six-step process framework that EUFLR and CSDDD both reference. Steps 1–6 map directly to Modules A (Embed), B (Identify), C (Assess), D+E (Respond), F+G (Track), Stage 4 (Communicate). Each question is tagged to the relevant OECD step.
HRDD Methodology
Shift Project / UNGPs
The Shift Project's operationalisation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provides practitioner guidance that sits between the regulatory text and implementation reality. The "lean in" principle (do not exit high-risk origins; this abandons the most vulnerable), worker voice standards, and leverage framework all inform the questions that go beyond the guidelines.
State-Imposed FL
UFLPA / OHCHR / ILO
The US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act entity list, OHCHR reports on Xinjiang, ILO annual reports on Turkmenistan, and EEAS 2021 due diligence guidance inform the state-imposed forced labour risk flags in Stage 1. These are updated as new evidence is published. The EUFLR Portal risk database (still in development as of October 2026) will replace these as the primary reference once operational.
Risk Data Sources — Stage 1 Heat Map
The Stage 1 preliminary risk map is built on the full US Department of Labor List of Goods (2024 edition), embedded in the tool and matched to the goods and countries you enter. Entries in known state-imposed forced labour contexts are flagged from the sources below. This is a macro-level risk signal — it tells you where to look, not what you will find.
Data Layer 1
ILO Forced Labour Country Data
ILO convention ratification status, documented forced labour by country and sector, ILO Better Work country programmes, and ILO Global Estimates of Modern Slavery (2022, updated 2024).
Data Layer 2
US DOL List of Goods
The US Department of Labor List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor (ILAB) — 2024 edition (September 2024): 204 goods from 82 countries, the edition this tool is built on. A commodity-country combination on this list triggers an elevated risk rating in the Stage 1 map. The next biennial edition was expected around September 2026 (check ilab.dol.gov); the 2024 edition added 72 goods over 2022, so combinations absent from this map may appear on the next revision.
Data Layer 3
State-Imposed FL Evidence
UFLPA Entity List (US), OHCHR reports, ILO Turkmenistan documentation, academic and civil society documentation for known SIFL contexts. Highest-confidence risk signals in the dataset.
What the risk map does not do: It does not assess your specific suppliers. It does not access real-time data feeds. The EUFLR Portal risk database (still in development) will provide the authoritative EU risk signal — Stage 1 will update to incorporate it on publication. Until then, the heat map uses the best publicly available proxy data. Treat it as a starting point for prioritisation, not a conclusion about your supply chain.
Geographic Dimension — How Countries Are Handled
Geography is the primary axis of forced labour risk — the same commodity carries very different risk profiles depending on origin country and region. The tool captures geography at three levels.
Level 1
State-Imposed FL Geographies
Specific regions where national governments compel citizens to work: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (polysilicon, cotton), Turkmenistan (cotton harvest), North Korean labour deployed in third countries. These trigger Module F automatically and carry the highest investigation risk under EUFLR. Standard audit evidence is assessed as insufficient for these origins.
Level 2
Commodity-Country High Risk
Specific commodity-country combinations with documented forced labour (ILO/DOL/NGO evidence): DRC cobalt, Malaysia electronics (migrant workers), Bangladesh garments, Thailand seafood, Côte d'Ivoire cocoa. These generate HIGH risk cells in Stage 1 and prioritise Module C questions accordingly.
Level 3
Your Specific Sourcing Origins
You enter your specific sourcing countries in Stage 1. These are cross-referenced against Levels 1 and 2. If you source from a country not in the risk database, it appears as MEDIUM risk (unknown / unassessed) rather than LOW — the absence of documented forced labour does not mean its absence. The investigation scenario in Stage 4 is built around your specific highest-risk geography.
Coming in next version: Sub-national geographic risk (province/state level) for the highest-priority commodities — recognising that risk within a country is highly uneven (e.g. Sabah vs Peninsular Malaysia for palm oil; Sichuan vs Xinjiang for polysilicon).
Where in the Production Process Does the Risk Sit?
Every company's supply chain is different, and the point at which forced labour risk concentrates depends entirely on the specific commodity, its production process, and the country of origin. There is no universal taxonomy. The EUFLR does not ask "which tier?" — it asks where in this product's specific production process is forced labour most likely to occur, and whether your due diligence reaches that point. For cotton, that is typically the farm and gin. For electronics, it may be the polysilicon reduction furnace. For cocoa, the individual smallholder farm. For seafood, the fishing vessel. Your Stage 1 commodity and country selections will drive the risk profile for your specific supply chain — that is where this tool maps your exposure, not here.
Reference — Authoritative Risk Lists
The most comprehensive publicly available commodity-country forced labour risk lists are: the US Department of Labor ILAB List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor (2024 edition: 204 goods, 82 countries; next biennial edition due September 2026 — ilab.dol.gov); the US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (annual country-tier ratings — state.gov/tip); and the EUFLR Forced Labour Single Portal risk database (in development — will become the authoritative EU reference on publication; the Portal itself is live). For Xinjiang-specific supply chain traceability, the ASPI Xinjiang Data Project and Sheffield Hallam University sector reports are the most rigorous independent evidence sources. None of these lists is exhaustive — documented forced labour risk extends across more than 204 goods, and the absence of a commodity from a published list does not constitute evidence that risk is absent.
Third-Party Schemes and Audits — What Gives Them Weight
When completing Stage 2 modules, you can note certifications, audit schemes and industry programmes as evidence against specific questions. The Commission's guidelines accept them as inputs: participation in multi-stakeholder or industry certification schemes and third-party audit reports are on the list of documents an authority may request (§4.7.1), and certification is named as one of several approaches that can be effective (§4.5.1.1). They attach two conditions. The company remains responsible for its own due diligence being effective, and it should assess whether a collaborative approach is fit for purpose in its own context and take additional measures where necessary (§6.4.1.3).
This tool takes no position on individual schemes. What matters is how an audit or programme was carried out, and the same four checks apply to all of them. Question D.7 asks whether you have made them.
Check
Why it matters
Guidelines
Which forced labour indicators can its methodology detect?
Indicators such as deception, retention of documents, threats and exploitation of debt leave little trace in records. A document-review methodology will not find them.
§3.4, §6.4.2.2
Are workers interviewed confidentially, away from management, by a trusted third party?
Audits carried out where workers are under threat, surveillance or management supervision, or where access is limited, are not treated as credible evidence.
§6.3.3, §4.8.1.1
How deep in the supply chain does it reach?
Investigations concern a product at every stage of extraction, harvest, production and manufacture. Assurance at the final assembly site says little about raw materials. Mass-balance or blended origin claims do not establish physical traceability.
§4.2, §4.7.3
Can it operate at all in the sourcing country?
In state-imposed forced labour contexts, on-site audits are compromised. Legal restrictions in the sourcing country may also prevent suppliers from taking part in a programme.
§6.4.2.2, §4.8.1.2
State-imposed forced labour: where auditor access is restricted, worker testimony cannot be obtained freely, and government presence prevents independent verification, the guidelines do not treat social audits as credible evidence unless they were conducted with unrestricted access and with workers able to speak freely and unsupervised (§4.8.1.2). Assessment there has to rest on traceability to origin, independent desktop research, reports from international organisations, expert analysis and credible civil society data (§6.4.2.2).
Structural Drivers of Forced Labour — The Scholarly Framework
The ILO forced labour indicators describe how forced labour manifests in a workplace — the observable signs that it is occurring. But they do not explain why it occurs where it does, or what conditions make some supply chain segments structurally prone to it while others are not. The academic and practitioner literature — including Siddharth Kara's work on bonded labour, Kevin Bales's structural model, the ILO's Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, Walk Free Foundation's Vulnerability Model, and Crane, LeBaron, Soundararajan et al. on modern slavery in global supply chains — converges on a consistent set of upstream structural drivers. Understanding these is essential for two reasons: they should inform how companies assess likelihood in their risk assessment (OECD Step 2), and they determine whether remediation will succeed or fail.
The tool's Stage 1 risk heat map captures the macro-level expression of some of these drivers (documented forced labour by commodity and geography). Module B asks whether your risk assessment has gone deeper, to evaluate structural factors for your specific supply chain segments. The table below explains what the literature says and what companies should be looking for.
Driver 1
Poverty & Income Insufficiency
The most robust predictor in the empirical literature. Workers below a living income threshold cannot afford to walk away from exploitative employment — the cost of exit (lost income, debt, displacement) exceeds the cost of staying. Kara's bonded labour research across South Asia and West Africa shows that debt bondage consistently originates in an initial financial crisis the worker cannot resolve from income alone. The ILO Global Estimates show that poverty is the single strongest predictor of forced labour prevalence across regions. The LICoP/Shift living income framework — designed for CSDDD — is directly relevant here as a risk indicator under EUFLR: a commodity-country combination where farm-gate prices consistently fall below a living reference price is a structurally high-risk environment for exploitation of debt and deceptive recruitment, regardless of what supplier audits show.
ILO Links
Deception Debt
Driver 2
Migration & Displacement
Migrant workers — both international and internal — are disproportionately represented in forced labour populations across all sectors and geographies. The ILO estimates migrants face nearly three times the forced labour risk of non-migrants. The structural mechanisms are consistent: unfamiliar legal systems remove knowledge of rights; language barriers limit access to grievance mechanisms; social isolation removes external support networks; dependence on the employer for housing creates a power asymmetry that persists throughout employment. Displacement — whether from conflict, climate events, or economic shock — compounds this by removing even the option of return. Supply chain segments with high migrant worker concentrations (Malaysia electronics and construction; Gulf migrant domestic workers; Southeast Asian seafood vessels; UAE and Qatar across sectors) require migration-specific risk assessment, not just general working conditions audits.
ILO Links
Vulnerability Deception Movement Isolation Documents Debt
Driver 3
Informality of Employment
Workers in informal labour arrangements — agricultural piece-workers, homeworkers, platform workers, domestic workers, artisanal miners — lack the legal protections, labour inspection coverage, and grievance access that formal employment provides. Informality is structurally connected to invisibility: informal workers do not appear in factory audits, payroll records, or social insurance systems. Crane et al. argue that the structure of global supply chains actively produces informality in their lower tiers by transferring cost pressure and risk downstream until it reaches workers who absorb it through unpaid labour and dangerous conditions. The CSDDD's explicit extension to self-employed workers reflects growing recognition of this. For EUFLR purposes, high informality in a supply chain tier is a structural risk multiplier — it reduces the likelihood that audit processes will detect forced labour even when it is present.
ILO Links
Vulnerability Wages Conditions Hours
Driver 4
Gender & Intersecting Vulnerabilities
Women and girls are disproportionately represented in forced labour populations — the ILO estimates 29 million of the 50 million people in modern slavery are women or girls. The mechanisms are sector-specific: in agriculture, women typically have weaker land rights and less income control than men in the same household, making them more vulnerable to recruitment fraud; in garments, women constitute the large majority of the workforce in export processing zones where freedom of association is frequently restricted; in domestic work, the combination of private household employment and migration creates extreme isolation. The LICoP/Shift guidance notes that within smallholder cocoa farming, income typically flows to male household heads rather than female pickers — meaning even where a "living income" metric is met at household level, female workers may remain in de facto financial dependence. Ethnicity, caste, and disability status intersect with gender as compound vulnerability factors in several high-risk geographies (Dalit workers in South Asia; ethnic minority agricultural workers in Southeast Asia).
ILO Links
Vulnerability Isolation Violence Threats
Driver 5
Weak Rule of Law & Labour Governance
Countries with low labour inspection density, high judicial corruption, restricted civil society space, or weak freedom of association protections consistently show higher forced labour prevalence independent of sector or commodity. This is not simply because forced labour goes undetected — it is because impunity removes the deterrent. The Walk Free Foundation Vulnerability Model scores countries on five dimensions: government response, civil and political rights, refugee flows, access to social protection, and conflict/instability. These dimensions correlate strongly with forced labour prevalence in the ILO's cross-country data. For due diligence purposes, weak rule of law in a sourcing country means that normal monitoring processes — audits, grievance mechanisms, corrective action plans — are less likely to produce accurate information and less likely to result in sustainable change even when they do.
ILO Links
All indicators
Driver 6
Buyer Business Model & Price Pressure
This driver is distinctive because it originates with the buyer company, not the sourcing context. Crane, LeBaron, and Soundararajan's 2019 analysis argues that modern slavery in supply chains is not primarily a governance failure in producing countries — it is a structural outcome of buyer purchasing practices that transfer cost and risk downstream until workers absorb them through unpaid or coerced labour. Practices identified include: prices set below the cost of legal, safe production; unrealistic lead times that require excessive overtime or outsourcing to unmonitored subcontractors; volume fluctuation that prevents suppliers from maintaining stable workforces; and payment terms that create supplier cash flow crises requiring short-term debt. The OECD Guidelines and CSDDD Recital 47 both explicitly identify harmful purchasing practices as a due diligence concern. This is why Module A asks whether due diligence findings are integrated into procurement decisions (A.5) and whether the organisation has reviewed its own purchasing practices (A.8) — because the buyer's own commercial behaviour may be a structural driver of the forced labour it is required to prevent.
ILO Links
Wages Debt Hours
Implication for Due Diligence
A risk assessment that only checks commodity-country combinations against a published risk list addresses the macro-level expression of these structural drivers — not the drivers themselves. The OECD Step 2 requirement to assess severity and likelihood of actual and potential adverse impacts requires engaging with structural risk factors in the specific context of each supply chain segment. Module B question B.5 asks whether your risk assessment has done this. Where structural drivers are present and unassessed, audit documentation alone leaves the risk assessment thin. This goes beyond the Commission's guidelines, which ask for risk factors to be considered but do not prescribe a structural analysis (§6.4.2.1).
Honest Limitations — What This Tool Cannot Do
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It cannot certify that your supply chain is free of forced labour
No tool, audit, or certification can make this claim. Forced labour is by definition hidden. What it can do is evidence that you took the required steps to identify and prevent it.
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It cannot assess the quality of your due diligence processes — only their existence
Whether your audits actually use worker interviews, whether your grievance mechanism actually works, whether corrective actions are actually followed through — these require human judgment. The tool asks whether you have these things; it cannot verify that what you have is effective.
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It cannot predict a specific competent authority's assessment
Different member states will develop different enforcement cultures and evidentiary standards, as they have under GDPR. A gap analysis that says "critical" means you have real exposure — it does not mean investigation is certain. An "elements present" rating does not mean investigation is impossible. Legal counsel who knows the specific authority is essential.
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It cannot assess your specific suppliers — only your processes for managing them
This tool assesses what you do as the economic operator. It does not access supplier data, third-party audit databases, or any external systems. Supplier-level data — audit reports, corrective action records, worker interview findings — should be logged in the Stage 4 Evidence Log manually.
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Commission guidelines verified against the Official Journal text — but they are guidance
The Commission's guidelines (C/2026/4637) are non-binding: they describe voluntary due diligence and say that only the Regulation has legal force. This tool was verified against their text in v1.1. A strong result shows that the measures the guidelines describe are in place; the guidelines themselves say that this does not guarantee a favourable outcome.
Stage 1
Company Profiling & Risk Scoping
Establish the regulatory framework applicable to your organisation and generate an automated preliminary risk map based on your commodity and country exposure. Complete all fields accurately — this profile drives which assessment modules are activated.
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Everything you enter stays in your browser. This tool is a single client-side file — no server, no analytics, no data transmission. Nothing you type here is sent anywhere or seen by anyone, including Development International e.V.
Organisation Details Required
Primary member states where products are placed on the market or produced
Supply Chain Exposure Risk Scoping
Select all commodity groups present in your supply chain, including components and raw materials — not only finished goods.
Cotton & Textile Fibres
Includes cotton, viscose, synthetic fibres. High risk: Xinjiang (XUAR), Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Electronics Components & Semiconductors
PCBs, chips, displays, wiring harnesses. High risk: Malaysia (migrant workers), China (various regions)
Cobalt & Battery Minerals
Cobalt, lithium, graphite. High risk: DRC (artisanal mining), child labour documented
Cocoa & Coffee
High risk: Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Brazil. Child labour and debt bondage documented
Seafood & Fish Products
High risk: Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar. Vessel-based forced labour, deceptive recruitment
State-imposed forced labour risk: Xinjiang polysilicon supply chain well-documented
Timber & Wood Products
High risk: Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar. Overlaps with EUDR obligations
Other Agricultural Commodities
Palm oil, rubber, sugar, tobacco, tea. Specify in notes below
List your top sourcing origins by volume, separated by commas. Include countries where components or raw materials originate, not only direct supplier countries.
Add any goods not covered by the groups above, separated by commas, using the names on the US Department of Labor list.
Show all goods on the list (click one to add it)
Preliminary Risk Map Automated Output
Risk data: US DOL ILAB List of Goods, 2024 edition (full list, embedded). State-imposed forced labour contexts flagged from ILO, OHCHR and UFLPA Entity List sources. Verify currency before relying on output for regulatory purposes — see Specifications page.
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Indicative Assessment Only
This map shows every entry on the US Department of Labor List of Goods that matches the goods and countries you entered. It indicates where deeper assessment is required — it is not a determination of actual forced labour in your supply chain, and a missing entry is not evidence of low risk.
Skipping shows the core EUFLR questions without personalisation: no risk heat map and a generic report header. You can return to complete this profile at any time.
Stage 3
Gap Analysis & Remediation Roadmap
Your assessment results ranked by priority. Priority reflects how directly each element bears on what an authority may ask for; it is this tool's weighting, not a legal threshold. Address critical gaps before the December 2027 application date.
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Critical Gaps
Core elements absent
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High Priority
Core partial · supporting absent
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Medium Priority
Supporting elements partial
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Elements Present
Documented
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Complete the Assessment Modules First
Gap analysis generates automatically as you complete the Stage 2 modules. Return here after completing at least Modules A, B, and C to see your preliminary gap report.
EUFLR Portal Readiness Checklist Portal Live
The Forced Labour Single Portal is live (June 2026); the risk database remains in development. Establish systematic monitoring now. Tick off each preparatory action as completed.
Stage 4
Evidence Log & Investigation Preparedness
A timestamped record of your due diligence activities, structured for competent authority preliminary assessments. Document what you did, when, by whom, and with what outcome. Evidence that predates a request shows a system that was already working.
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Investigation Response Window: 30 Working Days
Under Article 17 EUFLR, competent authorities conducting a preliminary assessment may request information from economic operators. This evidence log is structured to enable a rapid, comprehensive response within that window. Maintain it continuously — not only when a complaint is received.
Investigation Scenario Simulation
Based on your Stage 1 risk profile, here is what a competent authority investigation scenario would look like for your highest-risk supply chain segment.
Complete Stage 1 to generate your investigation scenario
Once you have profiled your company and supply chain, this section will simulate a realistic preliminary assessment scenario and identify what evidence you could and could not currently produce.
Due Diligence Evidence Entries Add New Entry
Log each due diligence activity with full documentation metadata. Include negative findings and partial findings — not only clean results.
Complaint Response Mode
30-Day Preliminary Assessment Response Planner
A complaint has been received — or you anticipate one. Triage your current evidence position, plan your 30-working-day response, and identify what can still be strengthened before the window closes.
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Engage Legal Counsel Immediately
A competent authority preliminary assessment is a legal proceeding. This tool supports preparation — it does not replace legal advice. Engage EU trade and human rights counsel as your first action.
Complaint Details Triage Input
Response Window Art. 17 EUFLR
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Calendar Days Left
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Working Days Left
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Submission Deadline
30 working days from receipt. Bar shows proportion of window elapsed.
Export & Download
Export, Save & Download
Your assessment data belongs to you. Download the tool to run offline, save your session to a file, and generate structured reports for board briefings, investor due diligence, or competent authority submissions.
Download Tool — Run Offline Recommended
This tool is a single self-contained HTML file. Download it to run entirely offline in any browser — no internet connection, no server, no third-party access to your data. Assessment data entered in a downloaded copy is stored only on your device. When running locally, all session data also persists between browser sessions automatically.
✓ Your data stays with you
No data is transmitted to any server. The tool runs entirely in your browser.
✓ Works fully offline
All assessment logic, risk data, and guidance is embedded in the file.
⟳ Check for the current version
This copy is v1.2 (November 2026). Before relying on an older download, check the current version at developmentinternational.org/euflr.
euflr-readiness-tool-v1.2.html · Development International e.V. · November 2026
Save & Restore Session
Save your current assessment session — all Stage 1 company profile data, Stage 2 answers, notes, and evidence log entries — to a JSON file on your device. Restore it in any future session, in this browser or in a downloaded copy of the tool.
Save Current Session
Exports all your current answers, company profile, commodity selections, evidence log, and notes to a .json file. Save it somewhere secure — this file contains your compliance gap data.
Restore Saved Session
Load a previously saved session file to resume your assessment exactly where you left off. All answers, notes, and evidence log entries will be restored.
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Data security note
Session files contain your organisation's compliance gap assessment. Treat them with the same confidentiality as the report outputs — store securely and distribute only to authorised personnel. Development International e.V. does not receive or have access to any session data.
Report Configuration
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Auto-Disclaimer
All exports include: "This report reflects the company's self-assessment against Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 and supporting frameworks. It does not constitute legal advice and has not been independently verified."